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31. Introduction
The ongoing transition of former communist countries from planned to market economies has
been one of the most important economic phenomena in the last few decades. It is interesting,
therefore, to consider whether the liberalization of domestic trade prompts major shifts in
price structures that were highly distorted under central planning (Fan and Wei, 2006). Such a
study is interesting because of the ongoing debate as to whether China’s gradualist reform has
been successful (see Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000; Young, 2000; Poncet, 2003 and 2005).
Since China embarked on its economic reform and adopted an open door policy in the late
1970s, its economic development has been greatly enhanced by its active participation in
international trade. However, recently there has been more debate about domestic trade and
China’s major trading partners have strongly urged it to further open its domestic market,
especially after it has admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, even if the
Chinese government removes the barriers to international trade, the effectiveness of this
policy might be compromised by regional trade barriers within China itself (Fan and Wei,
2006). It is thus useful to test whether domestic markets are in fact integrated which can then
provide some important information on how the market works in China (Zhou, Wan and Chen,
2000). Such information may help the government decide on the extent to which it should
intervene in the market (Wyeth, 1992) and how.
Oil prices have been extensively analysed in the literature over the past three decades
(Lanza, Manera and Giovannini, 2005). Much of the applied research and policy studies have
examined the role played by the price of oil in determining economic growth or inflation rates
both in developed and developing countries (Adrangi et al., 2001; Asche et al., 2003; Stern,
2000; Girma and Paulson, 1999; Gjolberg and Johnsen, 1999; Serletis, 1994; Shaked and
Sutton, 1982). Energy market integration has also been extensively investigated see for
example, Asche, Osmundsen and Tveteras, (2002); Asche, Osmunddsen and Sandssmark,
(2006); Bachmeier and Griffin, (2006); De Vany and Walls, (1999); Narayan and Smyth,
(2005); Adrangi et al., (2001); Asche, Gjolberg and Volker, (2003); Gjolberg and Johnsen,
(1999); Serletis, (1994) and Weiner, (1991). Recent work, however, reveals only one study,
Fan and Wei (2006), which reports results for China and tests for The Law of One Price using
72 time series (41 industrial products, 20 agricultural products, 13 other consumer goods and
18 service products). However, their study includes only two fuel variables (gasoline and
4diesel), which one might expect, a priori to be the most likely to show market integration
among the key energy inputs. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no specific study
on energy market integration using data from China, which also considers two other key fuels,
coal and electricity. Therefore, this study makes two contributions. Firstly, we investigate
energy price movements using a new, high frequency, data set that consists of the market
prices of four energy types (coal, electricity, gasoline and diesel) from 31 cities (all of which
are provincial or autonomous regions and municipal cities) collected at 10-day intervals over
a maximum of 132 months (from 1995 to 2005). Secondly, we provide results for two key
energy input prices, coal and electricity, whose price convergence has not yet been reported
for China.
The paper has four major goals. The first is to investigate energy market integration
across major cities in China; the second is to test whether energy prices converge to absolute
or relative price parity; the third is to estimate the rate at which relative prices converge to
their long-run values across cities, and the fourth is to identify causal relationships across
cities to observe how price information flows between cities. The rest of paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodologies used, followed in Section 3 by a
description of the new dataset utilised in the study. Section 4 presents the results and provides
main findings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodologies
A common approach used to investigate market integration is to apply unit root tests to
examine whether price differentials are stationary (see for example, Bernard and Durlauf 1996
and Greasley and Oxley, 1997). Rejection of the unit root hypothesis implies that the time
series of relative prices are stationary, such that relative prices will converge in the long run.
Otherwise, if the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, the relative price series will follow a
random walk (Fan and Wei, 2006).
The first stage of the time series based tests of price convergence utilises some form of
unit root test, for example the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In our particular example
we are interested in testing for integration of the relevant energy market across the major
Chinese cities, by testing for price convergence. Tests that suggest the relative price series
5[ )/ln( ., tjtijijt ggp  ] are stationary will provide some evidence of convergence, either absolute
or relative. The unit root-based tests utilise a regression of the form:
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Where  is the first-difference operator; c ,  and  are the parameters to be estimated; is
an identically independently distributed (i.i.d) error term; i, j and t refer respectively to city (i),
energy product (j) and time (t). The ADF unit root test is simply the test of whether ij is
negative and statistically significant. The number of lags, k, to be included in equation (1) for
each product and city series is determined individually using the modified Hannan-Quinn
criterion on a city-by-city and product-by-product bases.
All the ADF specifications include an intercept term to capture city-specific fixed effects
and a time trend. Such intercept effects may cover, for instance, city-specific transportation,
income levels, and local non-traded costs. The inclusion of the intercept term is also used to
test whether prices converge to absolute price parity (zero mean) or relative price parity
(nonzero mean) (Fan and Wei, 2006).
It is convenient to use one city as a benchmark ( jtg ) in order to generate relative price
series and conduct the ADF unit root tests.1 Theoretically, it is possible that all of the ADF
unit root tests will reject the null hypothesis no matter which city is chosen as a benchmark
( jtg ) if the energy market is completely integrated. However, there may be apparent
differences across energy products in the degree of market integration. Therefore, we firstly
conduct the ADF unit root tests using one city as a benchmark to see how many tests reject
the null. If the ADF unit root tests show almost all of them reject the unit root hypothesis for
some energy products, it may not be necessary to further conduct the ADF unit root tests of
relative price series on city-by-city basis. However, it may be more likely that the second
scenario holds and most of the ADF unit root tests do not reject the null hypothesis. In this
case, it can be argued that one city (or regional market) is not integrated with the benchmark
city (or region), but it does not mean this city (or regional market) is not integrated with other
cities (or regional markets). Therefore, we will conduct the ADF unit root tests on a city-by-
city basis in these circumstances. This suggests that the markets of some products may not be
1 We also consider and report some results where we benchmark against an average of all the city prices.
6integrated nationally, but it can be integrated regionally due to, for example, transportation
costs or network connections (especially for power supply markets). The city-by-city ADF
unit root tests may also provide some clues as to where the regional market is located and
which cities are included. If there are regional markets for coal and electricity, as the city-by-
city ADF unit root tests suggest, we conduct panel data unit root tests for those groups of
cities.
It is also interesting to measure the rate at which the relative price series converge to their
long-run values. Ceglowski (2003) discusses the rates of convergence and their ‘half-lives’
using the expression, )1ln(/)5.0ln( ij , where ij is a parameter to be estimated in equation
(1). Since, in our case, the energy spot price data used are recorded every 10-days, the final
half-lives are expressed in months by dividing the expression by 3.
Furthermore, it is also interesting to establish the direction of flows of information,
embodied in prices, between energy markets and by implication, test for Granger causality.
The following regression is used in this instance:
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The causality tests can be undertaken with the following null hypotheses:
01221   n (4)
Which implies there is no causality from jp to ip .
02441   n (5)
Which implies there is no causality from ip to jp .
3. Data
The data used in this empirical study are a panel data set of 10-day prices for four energy
fuels in 31 major Chinese cities.2 The price data are collected by the China Price Information
2 The cities are Beijing, Tianjin, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Huhehaote, Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Shanghai, Nanjing,
Hangzhou, Hefei, Fuzhou, Nanchang, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou, Nanning, Haikou, Chongqing,
7Center (CPIC) – a division of the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) of the
People’s Republic of China. The data are used in this study are spot prices and are regularly
collected on a ten-day interval (the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month) from local markets by
governmental agencies.3
Unlike other market price data, our fuel price data have no missing data during the study
period as fuels are extensively used in all cities. We use four major fuel products; coal,
electricity, gasoline and diesel. These panel data are truly nationally representative because
they cover the main fuel components, all provincial capital cities of mainland China, and the
period, 1995 to 2005. This is to be contrasted with most other empirical studies, which use a
price index of lower frequency (such as annual) data. The 10-day frequency of our price data
also corresponds well to the time needed for domestic price arbitrage as a lower frequency
(monthly) price data are not as useful when we wish to test for price convergence with any
degree of precision (Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, monthly spot prices are not as rich a data
source as 10-day spot prices, particularly if one wants to measure the half-life of subsequent
adjustment following the shorter time response (Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006).
The quality of Chinese data is often criticised as reporting in China is often affected by
political factors (Rawski, 2001). However, we believe that the data for specific product prices
collected by local government agencies under strict government mandates are unlikely to be
subject to manipulation. Central government requires the collection of prices for specific
products at fixed dates and locations and these price data are also available to the public so
that local officials would find it hard to report false data. Unlike macro-economic data (such
as GDP growth and employment rates), these micro data for prices could hardly serve as
indicators when assessing the performance of local officials and hence local officials have
little incentive to falsify them.
Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming, Lhasa, Xian, Lanzhou, Xining, Yinchuan, Urumqi. They include four municipalities and all
the capital cities for the 31 provinces and autonomous regions in mainland China.
3 The price data are collected to provide price information to the central and local governments for macroeconomic
management. According to state law, the local price bureaus in 31 major cities are obligated to report price information for a
specified list of products to the Price Information Center. The price information must be collected from fixed local markets.
The fuel price information is collected three times a month, on the 5th, the 15th and the 25th day of the month. The fuel names
are uniform across all cities, and all prices must be market prices.
84. Results and discussions
The methodology used here commences with unit root tests on the raw price data. The
individual unit root test results are displayed in Appendix 1 for the individual city levels data
series and Appendix 2 for the first differenced series. In summary the unit root tests show that
each of the 31 city price data series for all four energy products exhibit unit roots. All the
tests suggest that the first differences of the series are stationary and therefore that all series
are integrated of order 1 or I(1).
4.1 Shanghai benchmark
Having established that the raw price series each contain a unit root, we next conduct the ADF
unit root test for relative price series using Shanghai as a benchmark to examine whether
energy prices of all other cities converge with that of Shanghai. The test results are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1 shows that for coal, 9 of the 31 relative price series are significant at the 5% level
which means that few of the city price series show convergence in the case of coal. For
electricity, there are only two relative price series that reject the null hypothesis and indicate
convergence. However, for gasoline and diesel the opposite is true. Here, all but six (Tianjin,
Hangzhou, Nanning, Changsha [noted still at the 5.6% level], Chongqing, and Lhasa) of the
ADF unit root tests show rejection at above 5% level for the gasoline relative price series.
Likewise, almost the same is observed for diesel. In particular, there are 19 relative price
series that reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level, accounting for approximately 60% of the
total of 31 diesel relative series. In addition, there are three relative price series that reject the
null hypothesis close to the 5% level (Jinan, Nanning and Chengdu) and four at the 10% level
(Shijiazhuang, Huhehaote, Hangzhou and Urumqi). This means all but four (Hefei,
Guangzhou, Kunming and Lhasa) of the ADF unit root tests show rejection at above 10%
level for diesel.
At this stage we can see that gasoline and diesel prices show strong convergence with
Shanghai. If we take account of some special and remote regions (e.g., Lhasa, Urumqi,
Kunming), almost all gasoline and diesel prices series are convergent with each other.
9Therefore, we are able to conclude that the gasoline and diesel markets in China are integrated.
This finding is generally consistent with that in Fan and Wei (2006), the only difference is
that this study shows observed prices of more cities to be convergent, which may be due to
the unique features of the data we utilise.
However, for the coal and electricity markets we cannot conclude that they are nationally
integrated because only some (for coal) and a few (for electricity) pairs of relative price series
demonstrate convergence. Moreover, we are unable to identify the reasons either due to
commodity-specific characteristics (e.g., volume and network connection) or due to human
intervention (e.g., local or regional trade barriers and central priority policies for some special
cities or specific economic zones, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc). However, there
may be some regionally integrated markets for coal and electricity because it is possible for
those insignificant series to be convergent with those of its neighbours instead of convergent
with Shanghai. In effect, we may have ‘local convergence’ akin to the ‘convergence clubs’
found in the macroeconomic literature. To test for the possible existence of local convergence
we extend the research in two important ways. Firstly, we apply the same unit root testing
procedure on a ‘city-by-city’ basis to test whether there are regional markets for coal and
electricity. These city-by-city unit root test results are presented as Table 2 for coal and Table
3 for electricity. Secondly, we undertake panel-based unit root tests on a group of cities using
an average of a group of city prices as a benchmark to test whether the group of cities
identified above as convergent, are regionally integrated. These results are presented as Table
4.
4.2 City-by-city convergence
Firstly, consider the city-by-city results presented as Table 2, which show that there are 65
pairs of relative price series that reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (non-convergence) at
the 5% level, accounting for 14% of total (465) pairs of relative price series.4 In particular,
there are 12-13 pairs of relative price series that reject the null hypothesis for Shijiazhuang
(code 3), Nanning (code 20) and Chongqing (code 22). There are 7-10 pairs of relative price
4 In this study, we choose significant at the 5% level. At the 10% level there are 111 pairs of relative price series which reject
the null hypothesis, accounting for 24% of the total of (465) pairs.
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series that reject the null hypothesis for five cities, which are Beijing (code 1), Huhehaote
(code 5), Shanghai (code 9), Wuhan (code 17), Chengdu (code 23) and Xian (code 27).
It is interesting to note that the coal price in Taiyuan (code 4), which is located in Shanxi
province, the largest coal production base and accounting for approximate 20% of national
coal supply, is not significantly convergent5 with the coal price of its neighbors, Huhehaote
(code 5), which is located in Inner Mongolia autonomous region, the second or third largest
coal production area and accounting for about 10% of the national supply of coal. This
suggests that the coal price in Taiyuan is not convergent with the coal price in the production
area. However, for Huhehaote it seems the opposite holds as its coal price is convergent with
that of most of its neighbors (Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan and Changchun) and south towards Jinan,
Wuhan, Changsha and Shanghai.
If we consider columns 3, 20 and 22 in more detail, we are able to identify regional
energy markets and their locations. For example, the first starts from Shijiazhuang (code 3),
which converges with those of its neighbors: Beijing (code 1), Huhehaote (code 5), Shenyang
(code 6) and Zhengzhou (code 16). It extends southeast to Hefei (code 12) and Shanghai
(code 9), and southwest to Xian (code 27) and Wuhan (code 17) and might extend further to
the west to include Chongqing (code 22) and Chengdu (code 23). It therefore covers
approximately eleven cities and is geographically located in north, central and central west
China. Its track is generally from northeast to southwest and ‘bends’ to the southeast. Also
following convergent lines, Nanning (code 20) and Chongqing (code 22), comprise the
second coal market beginning at the east coast, Shanghai (code 9) and Hangzhou (code 11),
moving west first towards Hefei (12) and Nanchang (code 14), then towards Wuhan (code 17)
and Changsha (code 18). From there it moves further west to Chongqing (code 22), Chengdu
(code 23) and Xian (code 27) and south towards Nanning (code 20) and Guangdong (code 19).
This area covers eleven cities, which are located in the central west, central south, central east
and south of China.6 The general shape looks like a triangle, the top angle is located in
Shanghai and Zhejiang, two bottom angles are located in southwest (Sichuan and Chongqing)
and south (Guangxi and Guangdong).
5 Because their p-value is 5.7% and insignificant based the criterion used in this study.
6 It should be noted that some cities may be included in different markets.
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Moving to the results on electricity presented as Table 3, there appear to be fewer
examples of convergence. In particular, there are 38 pairs which reject the null hypothesis,
which account for 8.2% of the total (465) pairs of relative price series. There are only four
cities; Nanchang (code 14), Zhengzhou (code 16), Haikou (21) and Lhasa (26) that have 8-10
pairs of relative price series which reject the null at the 5% level. In addition, fewer pairs of
relative price series can be found to be convergent in the major cities. For example, none of
the pairs identified reject the null for Beijing (code 1) and Guangzhou (code 19). One pair
rejects the null for Nanjing (code 10) and Hangzhou (code 11). Two pairs reject the null for
Shanghai (code 9) and Jinan (code 14). Therefore, it seems less likely that the electricity
market can be described as ‘regionally integrated’ as was argued above for coal. However, we
found that there are 111 pairs which do reject the null hypothesis if the level of significance is
raised to the 10% level, accounting for 24% of total 465 pairs of relative price series. We also
found that the annual standard deviation coefficients have fallen since 1995. For example, it is
29.3% in 1995, 25.6% in 2000 and only 8.9% in 2005.7
In sum, based upon the city-by-city unit root tests we cannot conclude that the coal and
electricity markets are nationally integrated although we have found some evidence of ‘within
region’ convergence.
4.3 Panel unit root tests of convergence
Next, we use panel unit root tests which are less likely to suffer from multiple testing issues
and potentially size distortion as such tests are known to have greater power (Banerjee, 1999;
Maddala and Wu, 1999). Therefore, to test whether a group of cities belong to a certain
regional market, we use panel-based unit root tests as an alternative to the city-by-city
approach. We conduct two types of panel-based unit root tests. One is for the group of cities
that were previously identified as belonging to the same coal regional market. Another is for
the group of all cities for electricity, gasoline and diesel markets to demonstrate that the
electricity market is not nationally integrated and the oil markets are nationally integrated as
discussed previously.
7 Annual standard deviation coefficients are calculated by %100/)]1/()([ 5.02  ttit pnpp , where itp stands
for price for city i in year t, tp stands for average price in year t, n is sample size (here is 31).
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From Table 4, first we are able to conclude that both the coal regional market I and II
identified in the last section show convergence. Second, although two coal regional markets
are identified, they are very close geographically and partly merge together, which may imply
that both of them are also integrated and belong to a greater regional market. We can conclude,
based on Table 4, that both of the coal regional markets actually belong to the same greater
market, there defined as market III. In this case, if we ignore the remote cities (due to
transportation cost) and small regional economies which are much less likely to consume
large volumes of coal, most of cities in China might be regarded as belonging to one
integrated coal market as most appear to ‘converge’ to each other via a network of adjacent
prices. Third, the groups of all cities for gasoline and diesel prices also show convergence,
which further confirms our conclusion that both the gasoline and diesel markets are nationally
integrated in China. Finally, as for a national electricity market, the results not only do not
reject the most restrictive test at the 5% level, but they do not reject either of the Im, Pesaran
and Shin or Fisher Chi-square tests. This probably means that the electricity market in China
is not integrated.
4.4 Absolute versus Relative Price Convergence
To test for Absolute versus Relative price convergence we make use of the significance of the
intercept term in equation (1) in the cases where the series indicate convergence. The ‘test on
the intercept results’ are also shown in Tables 2 and 3 for coal and electricity, respectively.
The highlighted stars in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the intercept terms in equation (1) are
insignificant, which implies that prices are convergent to absolute price parity. Otherwise, the
unhighlighted stars in table 2 and 3 indicate that the prices converge to relative price parity.
Table 2 shows that there are 13 intercept terms (highlighted) insignificant at or above the 5%
level, accounting for 20% of the total of 65 pairs of convergent series for coal. In other words,
among the convergent series, only 20% converge to absolute price parity and 80% converge
to relative price parity. Similarly, for electricity there are 24 pairs, accounting for 63% of the
total of convergent series, that suggest absolute price parity and only 37% relative price parity
(Table 3). In addition, the observed magnitudes of the significantly different from zero
13
estimated intercept terms ( c ) for coal and electricity price, are all very small. This suggests
that the price ratios of two cities are close to unity in terms of intercept terms.
4.5 Estimated ‘half-lives’ to convergence
Using the expression )1ln(/)5.0ln( ij and the estimated ij in equation (1), we calculated
half-lives for those relative price series that reject the null hypothesis. The results are
presented as Table 5 for coal and Table 6 for electricity. The overall average rate is
approximately 3.4 months, implying that it takes 3.4 months for coal relative prices to
converge to their long-run values. The estimated half-lives vary little, the minimum rate is 1.4
months and the maximum is 6.2 months, and most fall in the range 2.0 to 4.5 months. For
electricity, the overall average rate is smaller, 2.2 months, implying that it takes 2.2 months
for electricity relative prices to converge to their long-run values. The estimated half-lives
also vary little, the minimum rate is 1.2 months and the maximum is 4.2 months, and most fall
in the range 2.0 to 4.0 months.
Turning now to gasoline, Table 7 reports results on the rate of convergence to long-run
values. Here we find that 186 pairs of relative price series converge to absolute price parity,
accounting for 78% of the total of 238 pairs of relative price series which reject the null
hypothesis of non-convergence. Three cities where price convergence is well established are
Jinan (code 15), Kunming (code 25) and Xining (code 29). Here the results suggest that
prices in these three cities converge to absolute price parity with more than 20 other cities.
Results for Shijiazhuang (code 3), Shanghai (code 9), Changsha (code 18), Chengdu (code 23)
and Guiyang (code 24), suggest that the relative price series are convergent to absolute price
parity with more than half of the other cities. Turning to the convergence rate, we find that the
rates are much faster than those of coal and electricity prices. In particular, the overall average
rate is estimated to be 1.7 months, which is a little higher than that estimated by Fan and Wei
(2006) where their estimate is 1.3 months. The maximum rate is approximately 4.9 months,
while the minimum rate is only 0.3 months (about ten days). Approximately 10% of the
convergence rates are less one month; 60% in the range 1-2 months and 27% between 2-3
months.
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Table 8 presents the results for diesel. Here we find 186 pairs of relative price series that
converge to absolute price parity, accounting for 82% of the total of 228 pairs of relative price
series that reject the null hypothesis of non-convergence. Four cities where more than 18
relative price series converge to absolute price parity are Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8),
Nanchang (code 14) and Chongqing (code 22). Six cities where more than 15 relative price
series converge to absolute price parity are Shijiazhuang (code 3), Changchun (code 7),
Shanghai (code 9), Zhengzhou (code 16), Changsha (code 18) and Xining (code 29).
Furthermore, we find that convergence rates are much faster than those of coal and electricity
prices, and even smaller than those of gasoline. In particular, the overall average rate is 1.6
months, which is smaller than that estimated by Fan and Wei (2006) where their estimate is
2.3 months. The maximum rate is 2.9 months, while the minimum is only 0.6 months (about
twenty days). Approximately 10% of the convergence rates are less than one month; 60%
range from 1-2 months, and 27% are between 2-3 months.
4.6 Granger Causality tests
The results for tests of Granger causality between each pair of cities where the relative prices
significantly converge are presented as Table 9 for coal and Table 10 for electricity. Firstly, it
can be seen from Table 9 that there are approximately 46 pairs of bi-directional causality,
accounting for nearly 54% of the total of 86 pairs of causal relationships for coal. However,
the causal relationships vary considerably across cities. For example, Shanghai (code 9) and
Nanning (code 20) have causally bi-directional relationships with 7 cities, while there are 14
cities that have no causally bi-directional relationships with others. Causality most likely
originates from Shijiazhuang (code 3), which causes coal price change in 12 other cities. This
is followed by Beijing (code 1), Shanghai (code 9), Wuhan (code 17), Nanning (code 20) and
Chongqing (code 22), which cause coal price changes in 6-7 other cities, respectively.
Observing these cities (Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Shanghai and Wuhan) where causality
originates, we find that almost all coal price changes originate from consumption areas rather
than production areas. However, we do find that one of the large production bases, Huhehaote
(code 5), has bi-directional causal relationship. Rather puzzlingly, we do not identify causality
originating either from the large consumption cities, such as Taiyuan (code 4), Nanjing (code
15
10), Jinan (code 15) and Zhengzhou (code 16) or from production cities, such as Taiyuan
(code 4), Harbin (code 8), Jinan (code 14), Zhengzhou (code 15) and Guiyang (code 24).
Secondly, there are 65 pairs of bi-directional causality, accounting for more than 90% of
the total of 71 pairs of causal relationships identified for electricity (Table 10). The origins of
causality appear more mixed, but it most likely that they originate from Haikou (code 21),
Nanchang (code 14) and Chengdu (code 23). However, there appear to be many more origins
including Shijiazhuang (code 3), Changchun (code 7), Zhengzhou (code 16) and Changsha
(code 18), that can cause electricity price change in 4-5 other cities. Considering the cities
listed above, we find that electricity price changes may originate from both medium sized
areas of consumption and production. It seems hard to establish that causality originates from
both large consumption areas, such as Nanjing (code 10) and Guangdong (code 19) and
production areas, such as Taiyuan (code 4), Hangzhou (code 11) and Jinan (code 15).
Finally, turn to the causality results for gasoline and diesel markets. The results are
displayed in Tables 11 and 12. It can be seen from Tables 11 and 12 that there are different
causal scenarios from those established for gasoline and diesel because, in part, there are
many more pairs of convergent relative price series.
The results presented as Table 11 identify 320 pairs of bi-directional causality,
accounting for nearly 90% of the total 357 pairs where causality is established in gasoline
prices. However, the causal relationship is richer and varies apparently across cities. For
example, Shanghai (code 9), Nanchang (code 14) and Changsha (code 18) have 18-19 bi-
directional causality relationships with other cities. Shijiazhuang (code 3), Huhehaote (code
5), Jinan (code 15), Chengdu (code 23) and Guiyang (code 24) have 15-17 bi-directional
causal relationships with other cities. The causality most likely originates from Shanghai
(code 9), Nanchang (code 14) and Changsha (code 18), then Shijiazhuang (code 3),
Huhehaote (code 5), Nanjing (code 10), Jinan (code 15), Wuhan (code 17) Haikou (code 21),
Chengdu (code 23), Guiyang (code 24) and Yinchuan (code 30). We cannot identify whether
causality originates from consumption cities or from production cities because most of cities
in China do not produce gasoline.
Table 12 presents the causality results for diesel. Here 409 pairs of bi-directional
causality are established, accounting for approximately 95% of the total of 432 pairs of causal
relationships identified. Again, the causal relationships vary across cities. For example,
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Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8) and Chongqing (code 22) have over 20 bi-directional
causality relationships with others cities. Taiyuan (code 4), Changchun (code 7), Fuzhou
(code 13), Nanchang (14), Zhengzhou (code 16) and Changsha (code 18) have 18-19 bi-
directional causality relationships with others. The causality also most likely originates from
Shenyang (code 6), Harbin (code 8), Fuzhou (code 13) and Chongqing (code 22), then from
Taiyuan (code 4), Changchun (code 7), Nanchang (code 14), Zhengzhou (code 16), Wuhan
(code 17) and Changsha (code 18). As with gasoline, we cannot identify whether causality
originates from consumption or producing areas because most of cities in China do not
produce diesel.
5. Conclusions
The paper investigates energy market integration in China utilizing a range of time series
econometric methods and a new, high frequency energy price data set. The results presented
here identify price series that converge to absolute or relative price parity and calculate the
rates at which relative prices converge to their long-run values. In addition, the paper
analyzed ‘causal’ relationships between prices across cities and sought to identify the most
likely origins. In summary the major findings comprise the following.
First, unit root tests show that gasoline and diesel markets are generally well integrated
across China as most tests reject the unit root hypothesis (of non-convergence) when applied
to relative prices. Once account is taken of some special and remote cities, it may be safe to
conclude that the gasoline and diesel markets are well integrated as a whole. This finding is
consistent with those of other authors.
All tests suggest, however, that the electricity markets are not as well integrated in
relation to price convergence. This may be due to commodity-specific characteristics (e.g.,
volume and network connection) or intervention (e.g., local trade barriers and central priority
policies). In the case of coal, city-by-city unit root tests suggest some regionally integrated
markets. If we ignore the remote cities (due to transportation costs) and small regional
economies which are much less likely to consume large volumes of coal, most of cities in
China might be regarded as belonging to one integrated coal market as most appear to
‘converge’ to each other via a network of adjacent prices.
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Secondly, we find that the estimated intercept terms are all very small and close to zero in
spite of their significance. Therefore, the price ratios of two cities are more likely close to
unity. As a result, most of relative price series may be regarded as convergent to absolute
price parity. This is particularly true for oil market prices.
Thirdly, the rates at which relative prices converge to their long-run values vary little and
are even faster compared with that found in other countries. For example, the rate of
convergence for U.S. coal markets ranges from more 6 months to more than 13 months
(Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006). However, the rate of convergence found here for China’s coal
market is, on average, only about 3.4 months.
Fourthly, a rich set of causality relationships appear to exist between cities. Many results
suggest bi-directional causality, so it is hard to establish the geographic source of price
changes. However, for coal and electricity it appears that both demand and supply cities show
some impact on the source of the observed price changes.
Eventually, the paper has made some important inroads into analyzing and testing the
degree and pervasiveness of energy market price integration in China by examining the time
series convergence properties of the relative price of four major energy inputs, coal, electricity,
gasoline and diesel. Given previous work and a priori expectations, the results for gasoline
and diesel were unsurprising, although their robustness utilizing a new and exciting dataset
were reassuring. The results on electricity and coal, however, suggest more work is required
to identify whether commodity specific factors or intervention are the source of (at best)
regional market integration or regional ‘price convergence’.
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Table 1. Unit root tests for relative price series (Shanghai is used as a benchmark)
Coal Electricity Gasoline DieselProvince City Code
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.*
Beijing Beijing 1 -2.81 0.058 -1.68 0.441 -3.14 0.025 -3.21 0.020
Tianjin Tianjin 2 -1.09 0.723 -1.59 0.486 -2.36 0.153 -2.87 0.050
Hebei Shijiazhuang 3 -3.95 0.002 -1.92 0.321 -5.21 0.000 -2.72 0.071
Shanxi Taiyuan 4 -1.87 0.347 -1.20 0.674 -4.29 0.001 -4.24 0.001
Mongolia Huhehaote 5 -3.54 0.007 -2.63 0.088 -3.99 0.002 -2.66 0.081
Liaoning Shenyang 6 -1.30 0.630 -1.38 0.593 -3.25 0.018 -5.12 0.000
Jilin Changchun 7 -1.98 0.295 -2.83 0.055 -3.58 0.007 -3.40 0.012
Heilongjiang Harbin 8 -2.35 0.158 -2.67 0.081 -3.63 0.006 -3.77 0.004
Shanghai Shanghai 9 - - - - - - - -
Jiangsu Nanjing 10 -1.02 0.746 -2.30 0.174 -3.20 0.021 -2.86 0.050
Zhejiang Hangzhou 11 -2.16 0.221 -1.97 0.298 -2.56 0.102 -2.61 0.092
Anhui Hefei 12 -2.05 0.266 -1.31 0.626 -3.98 0.002 -2.28 0.180
Fujian Fuzhou 13 -1.13 0.705 -1.77 0.393 -3.77 0.004 -3.57 0.007
Jiangxi Nanchang 14 -2.24 0.192 -1.57 0.497 -5.11 0.000 -3.84 0.003
Shandong Jinan 15 -3.70 0.004 -2.94 0.042 -3.70 0.004 -2.80 0.059
Henan Zhengzhou 16 -3.35 0.014 -1.53 0.518 -5.52 0.000 -3.55 0.007
Hubei Wuhan 17 -4.77 0.000 -1.68 0.440 -3.47 0.009 -3.36 0.013
Hunan Changsha 18 -2.54 0.107 -2.31 0.169 -2.82 0.056 -4.08 0.001
Guangdong Guangzhou 19 -2.37 0.150 -1.90 0.334 -3.81 0.003 -2.14 0.231
Guangxi Nanning 20 -3.57 0.007 -1.36 0.601 -2.23 0.197 -2.74 0.069
Hainan Haikou 21 -1.73 0.417 -3.84 0.003 -5.57 0.000 -3.38 0.012
Chongqing Chongqing 22 -3.44 0.010 -1.82 0.371 -2.49 0.118 -4.46 0.000
Sichuan Chengdu 23 -2.93 0.043 -2.46 0.127 -3.68 0.005 -2.78 0.061
Guizhou Guiyang 24 -1.35 0.607 -2.07 0.257 -3.86 0.003 -4.66 0.000
Yunnan Kunming 25 -3.09 0.028 -1.58 0.493 -3.71 0.004 -2.27 0.181
Tibet Lhasa 26 -0.90 0.788 -2.27 0.184 -1.88 0.343 -2.03 0.273
Shaanxi Xian 27 -2.58 0.099 -1.82 0.371 -3.23 0.019 -3.13 0.026
Gansu Lanzhou 28 -1.53 0.519 -1.76 0.399 -5.59 0.000 -3.30 0.016
Qinghai Xining 29 -2.51 0.114 -1.28 0.640 -4.86 0.000 -4.23 0.001
Ningxia Yinchuan 30 -2.57 0.100 -1.37 0.596 -4.88 0.000 -3.93 0.002
Xinjiang Urumqi 31 -2.26 0.186 -1.50 0.535 -3.22 0.020 -2.60 0.093
% of rejecting null - 9/31 - 2/31 - 25/31 - 19/31
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Null hypothesis is that each relative price series contains a unit root.
ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
Critical values: -3.44 (1% level), -2.87 (5% level) and -2.57(10% level).
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Table 2. Unit root tests for pairs of coal relative price series for those rejecting null significant at 5% (*) and 1% (**) level (highlighted stars indicate convergent to absolute price parity and the rest to relative price parity)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - ** - - - - - - - - * - - - ** - - - ** - * ** - - - * - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 ** - - * ** - - ** - - ** - - - ** * - * ** - * * - - - * - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 - - * - * - ** - - - - - * - ** ** - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - ** - - - * - - * - - - - - - - - ** - - - - - - * - - - -
7 - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - * - * - - - - - - - - -
9 - - ** - ** - - - - - - - - ** * ** - - ** - ** * - * - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - ** - - - - - - ** - * - -
12 * - ** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ** - ** ** - - - - - - - -
13 - * - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - * - - - - - * - -
15 - - - - * - - - ** - - - - - - * ** - - - - - - * - - - - - -
16 ** - ** - - - - - * - - - - - - ** - - - - ** - - - - - - - - -
17 - - * - ** - - - ** - - - - - * ** ** * * - * - - - - - - - - -
18 - - - - ** - - - - - - - - - ** - ** - - - * - - - - - - - - -
19 - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - ** - - - - - - * - - - -
20 ** - ** - - ** - * ** - ** ** - * - - * - ** - * * - - - * - - - -
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - -
22 * - * - - - - * ** - - ** - - - ** * * - * - * - - - - - - -
23 ** - * - - - - - * - - ** - * - - - - - * - * - - - - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
25 - - - - - - - - * - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27 * - * - - * - - - - ** - - - - - - - * * - - - - - - - **
28 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - -
29 - - - - - - - - - - * - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - ** - - -
30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 3. Unit root tests for pairs of electricity relative price series for those rejecting null significant at 5% (*) and 1% (**) level (highlighted stars indicate convergent to absolute price parity and the rest to relative price parity)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 - - - ** - - - - - - - - - - * - * - - - - ** - - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - -
5 - - ** - - - - - * - - - * - * - * - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * -
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - * - * - * - - ** - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - ** - - - - - - - - - -
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - ** - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - -
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - -
14 - - - - * - * - - - - - - - - - * - - ** - ** - - ** - - - - -
15 - - - - - - - * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 - - * - ** - * - - - - - - - - - - - - ** - ** - - * - - - - -
17 - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * - - -
18 - - ** - * - * - - - - - - * - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - -
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - ** ** ** - - - - ** - ** - - - - * - - - ** - - - - -
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * * - - - - - - - -
23 - - ** - - - - - - - - - - ** - ** - * - - - * - - * - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - * * - - -
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ** - * - - - - ** - * - - - - - - -
27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - * - - ** - - -
28 - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - * - - - - - - * - - ** - - -
29 - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
30 - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 4. Panel data unit root tests for identified regional or national markets (group average is used as a benchmark)
Regional
coal
market I
Regional
coal
market II
Regional
coal
market III
National
gasoline market
National diesel
market
National
electricity
market
Panel unit root tests
(assumption)
Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob.
Im, Pesaran and Shin -4.5 0.00 -4.7 0.00 -5.7 0.00 -14.2 0.00 -8.3 0.00 -0.8 0.21
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 61.0 0.00 66.1 0.00 97.4 0.00 359 0.00 205 0.00 60.2 0.54
Note: Exogenous variables are individual effects and linear trend and null hypothesis is unit root (individual unit root process). Regional
coal market I includes cities 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 22, 23 and 27; Regional coal market II includes cities 9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22,
23 and 27; Regional coal market III includes I and II; National markets include all cities.
24
Table 5. The estimated half-lives for coal (months) for those rejecting null hypothesis (unit root) at 5% and 1% significant level
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - 3.6 - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - 3.3 - - - 2.2 - 4.4 3.0 - - - 5.3 - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - 3.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 3.6 - - 3.1 3.7 - - 2.1 - - 2.8 - - - 3.4 4.3 - 3.2 1.7 - 5.6 5.3 - - - 4.9 - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 - - 3.1 - - 3.2 - 1.9 - - - - - 3.0 - 1.9 2.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - 3.7 - - - 2.1 - - 5.2 - - - - - - - - 1.7 - - - - - - 4.2 - - - -
7 - - - - 3.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - 2.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.8 - 5.9 - - - - - - - - -
9 - - 2.1 - 1.9 - - - - - - - - 1.8 2.3 1.4 - - 2.2 - 2.8 3.6 - 2.6 - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - 5.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.9 - - - - - - 1.8 - 2.5 - -
12 3.1 - 2.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.0 - 3.5 3.1 - - - - - - - -
13 - 3.5 - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.6 - - 3.9 - - - - - 3.1 - -
15 - - - - 3.0 - - - 1.8 - - - - - - 6.2 3.7 - - - - - - 5.0 - - - - - -
16 3.3 - 3.4 - - - - - 2.3 - - - - - - 4.0 - - - - 4.3 - - - - - - - - -
17 - - 4.3 - 1.9 - - - 1.4 - - - - - 6.2 4.0 4.2 3.2 3.8 - 4.9 - - - - - - - - -
18 - - - - 2.1 - - - - - - - - - 3.7 - 4.2 - - - 5.5 - - - - - - - - -
19 - - 3.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.2 - 2.8 - - - - - - 4.6 - - - -
20 2.2 - 1.7 - - 1.7 - 2.8 2.2 - 1.9 2.0 - 2.6 - - 3.8 - 2.8 - 4.4 3.4 - - - 2.6 - - - -
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - -
22 4.4 - 5.6 - - - - 5.9 2.8 - - 3.5 - - - 4.3 4.9 5.5 - 4.4 - 4.3 - - - - - - - -
23 3.0 - 5.3 - - - - - 3.6 - - 3.1 - 3.9 - - - - - 3.4 - 4.3 - - - - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
25 - - - - - - - - 2.6 - - - - - 5.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27 5.3 - 4.9 - - 4.2 - - - - 1.8 - - - - - - - 4.6 2.6 - - - - - - - 2.0 - -
28 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - -
29 - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.0 - - -
30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 6. The estimated half-lives for electricity (months) for those rejecting null hypothesis (unit root) at 5% and 1% significant level
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 - - - 2.2 - - - - - - - - - - 2.4 - 2.5 - - - - 1.3 - - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.2 - -
5 - - 2.2 - - - - - 4.2 - - - 2.4 - 2.3 - 2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 -
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.5 - 1.9 - 2.3 - - 1.3 - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.9 - - - - - 1.8 - - - - - - - - - -
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.0 - - - - - 1.6 - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - 4.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.6 - - -
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - -
14 - - - 2.4 - 1.5 - - - - - - - - - 4.0 - - 1.5 - 1.7 - - 1.7 - - - - -
15 - - - - - - - 2.9 3.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 - - 2.4 - 2.3 - 1.9 - - - - - - - - - - - 2.2 1.8 - - 2.7 - - - - -
17 - 2.3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 1.5 - - -
18 - - 2.5 - 2.4 - 2.3 - - - - - - 4.0 - - - - - - 1.9 - - - - - - - -
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - 1.3 1.8 1.6 - - - - 1.5 - 2.2 - - - - 2.5 - - - 1.9 - - - - -
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 2.4 - - - - - - - -
23 - - 1.3 - - - - - - - - - - 1.7 - 1.8 - 1.9 - - - 2.4 - - 2.2 - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.9 3.0 - - -
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.7 - 2.7 - - - - 1.9 - 2.2 - - - - - - -
27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.5 - - - - - - 2.9 - - 1.3 - - -
28 - - - - - - - - - - 1.6 - - - - - 1.5 - - - - - - 3.0 - - 1.3 - - -
29 - - - 1.2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
30 - - - - - 3.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 7. The estimated half-lives for gasoline (month) for those rejecting null significant at above 5% level (all numbers in this table are significant at above 5% level, the highlighted converge to absolute price parity and the rest to relative price parity)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - 1.2 2.9 1.8 - - 1.2 2.1 - - - - 2.2 - - - 2.5 - - 1.2 - 2.3 2.8 1.7 - 1.4 2.3 1.1 2.0 -
2 - - 2.8 - 1.9 1.0 - - 2.5 - - - - - - - 2.4 - - - 1.4 - 2.5 2.2 - - 1.6 - -
3 1.2 - 1.8 1.1 - - 1.0 1.1 2.3 - 1.8 - 1.5 2.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 - - 1.1 - 1.9 2.1 1.7 - 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.2
4 2.9 2.8 1.8 - - - - 1.7 0.7 - 1.4 2.7 1.7 2.0 - - 1.5 - - - - - 2.0 1.9 - - - 1.2 - -
5 1.8 - 1.1 - 1.8 - 0.7 1.7 - - - 1.5 1.6 2.9 0.8 0.7 1.8 - - 1.5 - 2.0 2.2 1.7 - 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 -
6 - 1.9 - - 1.8 1.1 - 1.6 - - - - 1.3 2.9 - - - - - - 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.7 - - 1.6 1.2 - -
7 - 1.0 - - - 1.1 - 1.1 1.5 - - - 1.0 - 1.3 - - - - - 0.9 2.0 1.2 1.9 - - - 1.3 - -
8 1.2 - 1.0 - 0.7 - - 1.3 - - - 1.0 - - 0.8 1.3 1.7 - - 1.2 - - - 1.7 - - - 1.1 -
9 2.1 - 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.1 1.3 2.1 - 1.6 2.0 1.2 2.9 0.8 1.6 - 2.4 - 0.9 - 2.0 2.0 2.1 - 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.7
10 - 2.5 2.3 0.7 - - 1.5 - 2.1 1.6 - - 1.6 2.1 - - 1.9 1.6 1.4 - - - 1.6 2.0 - - - 1.2 2.5 -
11 - - - - - - - - - 1.6 - - - 2.1 - - - 0.9 0.8 - - - 3.1 - - - - 1.4 - -
12 - - 1.8 1.4 - - - - 1.6 - - - - 3.0 - 1.9 1.3 2.9 - - - - - 2.0 - 1.7 - 1.4 2.1 -
13 - - - 2.7 1.5 - - 1.0 2.0 - - - - - - 1.5 2.4 - - - - - - 1.7 - - - 1.0 1.5 -
14 2.2 - 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.0 - 1.2 1.6 - - - 2.6 0.9 1.3 1.8 - - 1.4 - 1.8 1.6 1.9 - 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.5
15 - - 2.9 2.0 2.9 2.9 - - 2.9 2.1 2.1 3.0 - 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.7 1.5 1.9 3.4 3.2 2.3 - 1.8 - 2.9 3.2 1.0 2.9 -
16 - - 1.1 - 0.8 - 1.3 0.8 0.8 - - - - 0.9 2.8 0.6 0.8 - - 0.9 - - - 1.9 - 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.5 -
17 - - 1.1 - 0.7 - - 1.3 1.6 - - 1.9 1.5 1.3 3.1 0.6 1.4 - - 1.7 - 2.3 2.5 1.8 - 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 -
18 2.5 2.4 1.4 1.5 1.8 - - 1.7 - 1.9 - 1.3 2.4 1.8 2.7 0.8 1.4 2.3 - - - 2.5 2.2 2.2 - 4.9 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.9
19 - - - - - - - - 2.4 1.6 0.9 2.9 - - 1.5 - - 2.3 1.0 - - - - - - - - 1.5 - -
20 - - - - - - - - - 1.4 0.8 - - - 1.9 - - - 1.0 - - - - 2.2 - - - 1.3 - -
21 1.2 - 1.1 - 1.5 - - 1.2 0.9 - - - - 1.4 3.4 0.9 1.7 - - - - 2.1 2.5 1.9 - - - 1.2 1.5 1.2
22 - 1.4 - - - 1.1 0.9 - - - - - - - 3.2 - - - - - - 2.4 1.6 2.0 - - - 1.3 - -
23 2.3 - 1.9 - 2.0 1.4 2.0 - 2.0 - - - - 1.8 2.3 - 2.3 2.5 - - 2.1 2.4 - 1.7 3.8 1.4 2.1 1.0 2.6 2.5
24 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.2 - 2.0 1.6 3.1 - - 1.6 - - 2.5 2.2 - - 2.5 1.6 - 1.8 2.8 1.7 1.9 1.1 2.5 2.4
25 1.7 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.0 - 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 2.2 - 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 0.3 1.8 1.7
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3.8 2.8 2.0 - - 1.3 - -
27 1.4 - 0.6 - 1.0 - - - 0.9 - - 1.7 - 0.9 2.9 0.5 0.9 4.9 - - - - 1.4 1.7 1.9 - 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.1
28 2.3 - 1.0 - 1.1 1.6 - 1.1 - - - - 1.1 3.2 0.5 1.0 1.4 - - - - 2.1 1.9 1.8 - 0.5 1.1 1.1 -
29 1.1 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
30 2.0 - 0.6 - 0.9 - - - 1.2 2.5 - 2.1 1.5 1.7 2.9 0.5 1.0 1.4 - - 1.5 - 2.6 2.5 1.8 - 0.6 1.1 1.1 -
31 - - 1.2 - - - - - 1.7 - - - - 1.5 - - - 1.9 - - 1.2 - 2.5 2.4 1.7 - 1.1 - 1.1 -
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Table 8. The estimated half-lives for diesel (month) for those rejecting null significant at above 5% level (all numbers in this table are significant at above 5% level, the highlighted converge to absolute price parity and the rest to relative price parity)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - 1.8 2.0 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.3 2.5 - - - 1.2 - - 1.5 2.3 - - - - 2.8 1.2 1.3 1.3 - - - 1.4 1.1 -
2 - - - - - 0.7 - 1.9 1.3 1.7 - 2.5 - - 2.0 - 1.4 1.3 - - 1.8 - - - - 1.7 - - - -
3 1.8 - 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.8 - - - - 2.1 - - 1.5 2.4 - - - - 2.5 1.4 0.7 - - 1.5 0.9 1.3 0.7 1.4
4 2.0 - 2.0 - 1.0 1.1 - 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.7 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 - - 1.3 2.1 1.6 - - 0.8 1.5 - 1.5 -
5 2.5 - 1.8 - 2.3 - 1.5 - - - - 1.5 - - - - - - - - 2.7 2.2 2.9 - - - 2.1 2.3 - -
6 1.9 - 1.4 1.0 2.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.9 - 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 - - - 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 - 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 -
7 2.1 0.7 1.2 1.1 - 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.5 - - 1.9 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 - - - 1.7 1.9 1.0 - - 1.1 1.0 - - -
8 1.3 - 0.8 - 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.7 - - 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.6 2.0 - - 2.1 2.6 1.2 0.7 1.1 2.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.5
9 2.5 1.9 - 1.3 - 1.2 1.2 1.7 - - - 2.3 1.5 - 0.9 1.5 1.1 - - 1.4 1.8 - 1.2 - - 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.4 -
10 - 1.3 - 1.0 - 1.7 1.5 - - 1.3 - - 1.6 - - - 1.6 1.2 1.8 - 1.5 - - - - - - - - -
11 - 1.7 - 1.5 - 1.9 - - - 1.3 - - - 2.9 - - - 1.2 1.0 - 2.0 - - - - 2.2 - - - -
12 - - - 1.3 - - - 2.0 - - - - 1.1 - - - - - - 0.9 1.4 - - - - - - - - -
13 1.2 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.3 2.3 - - - - - 1.7 1.6 - - - 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.7 - - 1.9 1.2 2.7
14 - - - 0.9 - 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 - 1.1 - - 1.1 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.7 1.1 1.6 - 1.6 - - 1.0 - 1.5 1.6 2.5
15 - - - 1.5 - 1.5 1.7 1.7 - - 2.9 - - - - 2.5 2.6 - - - 1.9 1.6 1.8 - - 1.4 - 1.2 1.0 -
16 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.1 - 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 - - - 1.7 1.1 - 0.6 1.5 - - - 1.2 - 0.7 - - 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.9
17 2.3 - 2.4 1.0 - 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.5 - - - 1.6 1.2 2.5 0.6 1.9 - - 1.2 1.5 - 1.3 - - 0.8 2.0 - 1.0 -
18 - 1.4 - 1.5 - 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.1 1.6 - - - 1.7 2.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.9 2.8 1.6 - - 1.5 2.4 1.6 2.0 -
19 - 1.3 - 1.8 - - - - - 1.2 1.2 - - 2.1 - - - 1.6 1.0 - 2.6 - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - - 1.8 1.0 - - 2.7 - - - 1.6 1.0 - 2.4 - - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - - 2.1 1.4 - - 0.9 1.8 1.1 - - 1.2 1.1 - - 1.3 - 2.1 - - - - - - -
22 2.8 1.8 2.5 1.3 2.7 1.8 1.7 2.6 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.6 2.4 1.3 2.3 1.6 1.9 - 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.8 2.7
23 1.2 - 1.4 2.1 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.2 - - - - 1.7 - 1.6 - - 2.8 - - - 2.3 - - - - 1.7 1.5 1.2 -
24 1.3 - 0.7 1.6 2.9 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.2 - - - 1.4 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.6 - - 2.1 1.6 - - - - - - - -
25 1.3 - - - - 1.8 - 1.1 - - - - - 2.3 - - - - - - - 1.9 - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - 2.0 - - - - 2.7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2.2 - - -
27 - 1.7 1.5 0.8 - 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.4 - 2.2 - - 1.0 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.5 - - - 1.4 - - - - 1.0 0.7 0.8 -
28 - - 0.9 1.5 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.7 2.0 - - - - - - 1.1 2.0 2.4 - - - 2.0 1.7 - - 2.2 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.6
29 1.4 - 1.3 - 2.3 1.1 - 1.1 1.2 - - - 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 - 1.6 - - - 1.4 1.5 - - - 0.7 1.2 0.9 -
30 1.1 - 0.7 1.5 - 0.9 - 0.8 1.4 - - - 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 - - - 1.8 1.2 - - - 0.8 0.9 0.9 -
31 - - 1.4 - - - - 1.5 - - - - 2.7 2.5 - 1.9 - - - - - 2.7 - - - - - 1.6 - -
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Table 9. Causality among coal price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - - - - - - - - - - → - - - → - - - ↔ - ↔ → - - - ↔ - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 → - - → → - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - ↔ → - ↔ ↔ - → → - - - → - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - → - - → - - - - - - - - → - - - - - - → - - - -
7 - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - -
9 - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ - → - -
12 - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
15 - - - - → - - - ↔ - - - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
17 - - - - → - - - → - - - - - → → → → → - → - - - - - - - - -
18 - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
19 - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - → - - - -
20 ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → - - -
22 ↔ - - - - - - → → - - → - - - - → - → - - - - - - - - - -
23 - - - - - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - → - - - - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
25 - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27 ↔ - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - → - - - - - - - ↔ - -
28 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
29 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - -
30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table 10. Causality among electricity price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3 - - - → - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → - -
5 - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ -
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - -
8 - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - -
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - -
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - -
14 - - - - → - ↔ - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - -
15 - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - -
16 - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - -
17 - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - -
18 - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - -
22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - -
23 - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - -
24 - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - → ↔ - - -
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - → - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - -
27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
28 - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ - - → - - -
29 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
30 - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
31 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
30
Table 11. Causality among gasoline price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - -
2 - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - → → - - - - - -
3 ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - →
4 ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - -
5 ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ -
6 - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ → - ↔ - - -
7 - ↔ - - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ → - - - - - -
8 → - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - -
9 ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ → ↔ ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔
10 - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - → ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ -
11 - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - → - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - - - -
12 - - ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - → - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - ↔ - - ↔ -
13 - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ -
14 ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔
15 - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ -
16 - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ -
17 - - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - → ↔ - ↔ -
18 → ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔
19 - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - -
21 ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔
22 - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - → - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - -
23 ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - → - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔
24 ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - → → - - → →
25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - → - → - - - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - -
27 → - ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ → - - - - - ↔
28 → - → - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ → - - → - ↔ -
29 - - - - - - → - - - - - - - - - - → → - - - - - ↔ - - - - -
30 → - → - ↔ - - - → ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ → - - → ↔ - -
31 - - ↔ - - - - - → - - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ → - - ↔ - -
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Table 12. Causality among diesel price series (→ stands for information flows from row to column)
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ -
2 - - - - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - -
3 ↔ - → - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
4 ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ -
5 ↔ - → - → - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - ↔ → ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - -
6 ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ -
7 ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - - -
8 ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
9 ↔ ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ -
10 - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - -
11 - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - -
12 - - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - -
13 ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔
14 - - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔
15 - - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ ↔ -
16 ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
17 → - → → - → ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → - - → ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ - → -
18 - ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ -
19 - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - - - - - - - - - -
20 - - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - -
21 - - - - - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - -
22 → ↔ ↔ → ↔ ↔ → ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → ↔ ↔ → → ↔ ↔ ↔ → ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ →
23 ↔ - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ -
24 ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - ↔ - - - - - - - - -
25 ↔ - - - - ↔ - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - -
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27 - ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ -
28 - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ → - - - - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - → ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔
29 ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ -
30 ↔ - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ - - - ↔ ↔ ↔ -
31 - - ↔ - - - - ↔ - - - - ↔ ↔ - ↔ - - - - - - - - - - - ↔ - -
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Appendix 1. Unit root tests for raw price series (level)
Coal Electricity Gasoline DieselCity Code
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.*
Beijing 1 -0.71 0.841 -0.85 0.803 0.23 0.974 -0.64 0.859
Tianjin 2 -2.51 0.114 -0.38 0.909 0.30 0.978 -0.30 0.922
Shijiazhuang 3 -0.91 0.785 -1.55 0.506 0.43 0.984 -0.70 0.844
Taiyuan 4 -0.38 0.909 -0.19 0.937 -0.01 0.956 -0.50 0.889
Huhehaote 5 0.01 0.958 -2.15 0.224 0.19 0.972 -0.66 0.854
Shenyang 6 -1.15 0.697 -1.27 0.643 0.17 0.970 -0.82 0.812
Changchun 7 -0.47 0.894 -1.71 0.426 -0.20 0.935 -0.71 0.842
Harbin 8 -1.15 0.696 -1.79 0.387 0.23 0.974 -0.96 0.767
Shanghai 9 -0.99 0.757 -1.89 0.335 -0.03 0.955 -0.47 0.893
Nanjing 10 -2.28 0.180 -1.68 0.442 0.15 0.969 -0.57 0.873
Hangzhou 11 -0.70 0.845 -2.66 0.082 0.28 0.977 -0.35 0.914
Hefei 12 -0.23 0.932 -0.17 0.940 0.61 0.990 -0.11 0.946
Fuzhou 13 -2.63 0.088 -1.94 0.313 0.15 0.969 -0.73 0.835
Nanchang 14 -1.32 0.623 -1.97 0.300 0.10 0.966 -0.04 0.954
Jinan 15 -0.20 0.936 -1.83 0.364 0.09 0.965 -0.38 0.910
Zhengzhou 16 0.14 0.969 -1.98 0.295 0.19 0.972 -0.12 0.945
Wuhan 17 -0.01 0.956 -1.22 0.667 0.70 0.992 -0.22 0.933
Changsha 18 0.54 0.988 -1.72 0.420 0.13 0.968 -0.64 0.858
Guangzhou 19 -0.27 0.926 -1.96 0.305 0.21 0.973 -0.67 0.851
Nanning 20 -0.80 0.818 -1.23 0.664 0.29 0.977 -0.49 0.891
Haikou 21 -1.73 0.416 -1.75 0.407 0.23 0.974 -0.72 0.840
Chongqing 22 -1.60 0.482 -2.03 0.273 0.29 0.978 -0.10 0.947
Chengdu 23 -0.70 0.845 -1.49 0.538 -0.21 0.935 -0.27 0.927
Guiyang 24 -1.54 0.510 -2.40 0.142 -0.02 0.955 -0.53 0.881
Kunming 25 -0.56 0.877 -0.72 0.839 -3.85 0.083 -0.92 0.782
Lhasa 26 - - -1.89 0.335 -0.36 0.912 -1.28 0.640
Xian 27 -2.14 0.229 -2.98 0.088 0.21 0.973 -0.71 0.842
Lanzhou 28 -2.06 0.260 -2.28 0.180 0.61 0.990 -0.42 0.903
Xining 29 0.24 0.975 -0.58 0.872 -4.73 0.070 0.12 0.967
Yinchuan 30 0.53 0.988 -0.84 0.808 0.42 0.984 -0.62 0.863
Urumqi 31 -2.14 0.229 -2.21 0.202 0.38 0.982 -0.53 0.882
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Note: Null hypothesis is that each series contains a unit root; ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; Critical values:
-3.44 (1% level), -2.87 (5% level) and -2.57(10% level).
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Appendix 2. Unit root tests for coal and electricity raw price series (first difference)
Coal ElectricityCity Code
t-stat. Prob.* t-stat. Prob.*
Beijing 1 -4.93 0.000 -29.65 0.000
Tianjin 2 -19.77 0.000 -32.86 0.000
Shijiazhuang 3 -14.06 0.000 -9.83 0.000
Taiyuan 4 -22.06 0.000 -33.22 0.000
Huhehaote 5 -9.20 0.000 -30.45 0.000
Shenyang 6 -11.37 0.000 -11.13 0.000
Changchun 7 -4.52 0.000 -33.52 0.000
Harbin 8 -21.36 0.000 -27.74 0.000
Shanghai 9 -21.06 0.000 -31.29 0.000
Nanjing 10 -20.89 0.000 -29.63 0.000
Hangzhou 11 -5.70 0.000 -30.50 0.000
Hefei 12 -18.47 0.000 -33.14 0.000
Fuzhou 13 -10.03 0.000 -32.61 0.000
Nanchang 14 -23.39 0.000 -11.51 0.000
Jinan 15 -5.53 0.000 -27.18 0.000
Zhengzhou 16 -19.86 0.000 -6.98 0.000
Wuhan 17 -8.10 0.000 -28.84 0.000
Changsha 18 -12.11 0.000 -23.62 0.000
Guangzhou 19 -19.44 0.000 -29.34 0.000
Nanning 20 -20.47 0.000 -26.90 0.000
Haikou 21 -10.93 0.000 -32.77 0.000
Chongqing 22 -7.88 0.000 -10.91 0.000
Chengdu 23 -6.93 0.000 -32.20 0.000
Guiyang 24 -6.73 0.000 -28.91 0.000
Kunming 25 -14.13 0.000 -26.04 0.000
Lhasa 26 - - -11.28 0.000
Xian 27 -26.18 0.000 -34.10 0.000
Lanzhou 28 -6.66 0.000 -30.67 0.000
Xining 29 -19.20 0.000 -35.04 0.000
Yinchuan 30 -8.13 0.000 -21.56 0.000
Urumqi 31 -27.73 0.000 -31.08 0.000
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Note: Null hypothesis is that each series contains a unit root; ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; Critical
values: -3.44 (1% level), -2.87 (5% level) and -2.57(10% level).
